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On 22 February 1978, exactly a year after delivering the 
death-blow to the little-lamented Scotland and Wales Bill, MPs 
settled down to give a third reading to the more robust of its 
offspring, the Scotland Bill. A casual observer might have been 
forgiven for supposing that nothing had changed. There were 
more speeches against devolution than in favour, as before. 
It was said that the heart of the Commons was not in the Bill, 
as before. Mr Tam Dalyell, on the Labour side, was rising from 
his mound of papers like a jack-in-the-box, as before. Across the 
chamber, Mr Enoch Powell was lounging, sphinx-like, as if he had 
not moved since he helped to check the guillotine twelve months 
before. Yet the truth is that everything had changed, except the 
House of Commons.l 
The Bill had changed, and so had the Government's tactics. 
The odd coalitions of supporters and opponents had shifted a 
little. The unionists were more determined, and so were the 
Nationalists. Above all, the stakes were higher. But maybe the 
most important change was that the Bill was actually discussed 
at some length and not subjected to filibuster (at least, not 
successfully). The question is: why did the anti-devolutionists 
fail to stop the Bill and fail to change the structure of the 
Assembly as envisaged by the Government? The story of the 
committee stage is the story of the failure of the "antis" to 
turn their natural majority against devolution into victory.2 
·It is easy enough to explain this by Government arm-
twisting and the spectre of a General Election, but that is not 
good enough. The Conservatives, Ulster Unionists and assorted 
Labour rebels should have been able to use the committee 
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stage to cripple the Bill. Yet what did they manage? The only 
clauses removed from the Bill were declaratory, and did not 
affect the arrangements for setting up an Assembly. One (Clause 
1) declared that the proposals which followed did not affect the 
unity of the United Kingdom, and the other (Clause 40) stated 
that the Assembly would "have regard" to national pay policy. 
The Government hardly noticed they had gone. 
What the opponents of the Bill did achieve was the imposi-
tion of the 40% test in the referendum which would follow 
Royal Assent and the addition of an opt-out clause for Orkney 
and Shetland. So the Secretary of State will be required to lay 
before Parliament an order repealing the Act unless at least 
40% of the Scottish electorate vote "Yes", and to set up a 
commission to consider the future of Orkney and Shetland if 
the islanders vote "No". Thus the case put by the antis will 
be decided outside the House: during the long days of debate 
they made no significant internal changes in the Bill. Given the 
frequent assertion that the Commons were solidly against devolu-
tion, that needs some explanation. Whips, for all their power, 
are not enough to account for it. 
To begin at the beginning, Scotland and Wales were dealt 
with in separate Bills, as all the antis (and the Liberals) had 
said they should be from the start. Wales, where the fervour 
for devolution was muted, was promised an executive body 
only: Scotland held on to its "Parliament". Thus the Govern-
ment were guaranteed the votes of some Labour rebels who 
had voted down the combined bill because of their passionate 
belief that Wales did not want devolution. Not surprisingly, 
most of them were Welsh. 
The second crucial concession was the referendum. Towards 
the final days of the Scotland and Wales Bill, as it hung in 
parliamentary limbo, Government Ministers began to espouse 
the notion of shifting the last responsibility for the Bill to the 
people themselves, hoping to give the Commons a hefty shove. 
The introduction of the referendum was necessary to buy votes: 
some anti-devolutionists would be happy to have it both ways, 
voting for their Government in the lobbies and reserving the 
right to campaign for "No" in the country. The referendum 
would allow a kind of controlled schizophrenia in the Labour 
Party which might ensure that the Bill passed its third reading, 
leaving the Government to fight another battle, an easier one, on 
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the hustings. Assuming that the rush to devolve began with the 
belief that the people wanted it, this at least seemed logical. 
The splitting of the Bills and the introduction of the 
referendum were the moves which gave devolution a new lease of 
life, but parliamentary arithmetic demanded more. The Liberals, 
who had split against the first guillotine, had to be brought 
round. The new Bill which emerged in November 1977 could 
scarcely be said to be bristling with Liberal fire, but it was 
cheerfully admitted in Government circles later that they had 
won "more than 50% of their battles", quite enough to keep 
them happy. 
In the lengthy (and secret) talks which preceded publica-
tion of the new Bill, the Liberal banner was carried by Mr 
Russell Johnston, MP for Inverness-shire, and by Lord Mackie 
of Benshie, a grand old man of the party if ever there was one, 
and a formidable fighter. They faced Mr John Smith, Minister 
of State in the Privy Council Office and argued for proportional 
representation in Assembly elections; a relaxation of the powers 
of the Secretary of State to override Assembly decisions; a 
quasi-constitutional court to settle questions about the scope of 
its powers on legal rather than political grounds; tax-raising 
powers for the Assembly and provisions which would end the 
proposed annual haggle between Westminster and Edinburgh 
over the block grant. 
The talks were amicable. The Liberals knew they could not 
hope for a Government committment on PR; but they got a 
promise of a free vote on the Labour side. On the question of 
a constitutional court, the Liberals were satisfied with the role 
assigned to the judicial committee of the Privy Council, giving 
it pre- and post-enactment powers of review on Assembly 
legislation and removing the more offensive aspects of the over-
ride powers enjoyed by the Secretary of State which had aroused 
such opposition in the original Bill. They dropped their tax-
raising demand when the Government said they would introduce 
a proposal if they could find a workable system. They could not, 
and did not, but honour was satisfied on both sides. On the 
block grant, there was to be no new clause in the Bill, but a 
promise that the Government would consult with the Assembly 
about the possibility of four-yearly rather than annual negotia-
tions. 
So the Liberals were brought in. However, the Lib-Lab 
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talks should not be seen simply as a Government surrender to 
some sort of blackmail from a crucial voting block. After the 
stalemate of the Scotland and Wales Bill, there is evidence that 
the Government rethought their whole approach to devolution. 
Some of the major changes might have come without Liberal 
pressure - the apparent loosening of the over-ride powers, for 
example - because the most important thing was to produce 
a Bill which would be reasonably attractive to the electorate 
who were to be given the chance to seal its fate in the referen-
dum. Any concession to popular feeling which did not increase 
parliamentary opposition made political sense. 
In redrafting the Bill, Mr Smith and the civil servants in 
the Devolution Unit strengthened considerably the position of 
the Assembly. While the UK Parliament would remain sovereign 
- the keystone of the Government's fight against the SNP - at 
several key points the word "shall" in relation to the Assembly 
was changed to "may". Even in such an apparently uncontro-
versial section as that dealing with standing orders, the 
Government argued that the precise nature of the rules by 
which the Assembly would conduct its business were a matter 
for the elected members and should not be imposed from outside. 
Such a defence of the Assembly's right to some freedom of action 
was hardly likely to calm the frenzy of the die-hard antis and 
could be seen as a hindrance to the passage of the Bill through a 
reluctant House. But nonetheless it was done. 
So there was considerable progress in the constitutional 
arrangements during the months after the first guillotine defeat. 
But on the economic front there was almost none. The main 
reason for this was the hostility of the Government's 
"supporters" from North-East England, Merseyside and parts 
of the West Midlands who bitterly resented what they feared 
would be economic "weighting" in favour of Scotland's problems, 
while their own areas of deprivation were left to fester. Pleas for 
wider Assembly control over trade and industry might have been 
logical or even necessary, but concessions would probably have 
meant another fiasco on guillotine night, and that would have 
been the end of the story. So the Government gave no ground. 
Mr Smith demonstrated in the run-up to the second attempt 
to get a Bill through the House that he was a master of the 
balancing act needed to placate those who were offended by 
the limited extent of devolution and at the same time those who 
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would resist any attempt to devolve significant economic powers. 
The committee stage was to prove that this strategy - at least 
as a realistic assessment of what was possible - was right. 
The guillotine vote came on the night of 16 November 
1977, and as the majority of 26 for the Government was 
announced, the faces on the Front Bench were a picture. Mr 
Smith wore a very broad grin, the broader for having gone 
through the trauma of that vote nine months before when he 
saw, not only his Bill in ruins, but maybe his promising Ministerial 
career as well. He had no illusion that the Commons approved 
of devolution any more than it had done before, but he guessed 
that the Government had found a formula which would link 
most of his party, the Liberals, the SNP and a couple of stray 
Tories in a fragile coalition which could stagger through the 
hours of committee debate on the floor of the House and emerge 
with a Bill more or less intact. The proposals were far from 
perfect - for anybody on the devolution side - but they might 
at least become law. 
In his closing speech on the debate on the guillotine -
imposing a strict timetable for the discussion of amendments 
which would prevent a filibuster - he said: "The House of 
Commons must have the capacity to act as well as to argue. We 
are not a talking shop to embark on endless discussion on 
interesting points about Bills. We are a legislative chamber and 
we have an obligation to come to decisions and to act upon 
them. It is not as though devolution was hurried into the House 
of Commons last week and was being rushed through in some 
fleeting way."3 
That simple argument was the strongest card. There was no 
such thing as devolution in principle, the Government seemed to 
say, only a workable scheme for an Assembly. Ten years had 
passed since Edward Heath made the "Declaration of Perth" at 
the Scottish Tory Party conference and delay was no longer 
acceptable. So Mr Smith had the argument ready, and the 
political instinct and intellectual capacity to drive it home from 
the dispatch box. He was assisted in his task by the fact that 
the Tories did not have their argument ready. 
The difficulties in which they were to find themselves 
during the 91 hours of debate by the committee are epitomised 
by the predicament of Mr Francis Pym, their chief devolution 
spokesman, in that guillotine debate. As a former Chief Whip 
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in the Heath Government, he had supervised the application 
of a guillotine on the European Communities Bill and was thus 
in a difficult position to argue that there should be no curbs 
on the discussion of a major constitutional Bill. Indeed Mr Pym 
was on record - outside the Commons - as saying that the 
Government were right in claiming that it was impossible to 
steer a constitutional measure through the Commons without 
a guillotine if there was organised opposition to it. The power 
of a small group of backbenchers to stop legislation in its tracks 
increases as one night of debate follows another and the faint-
hearted lose their appetite for the struggle. It was precisely what 
had happened to the Scotland and Wales Bill and everyone knew 
it would happen to the Scotland Bill. The Tories objected to the 
term "filibuster", but to most observers it was the first word 
which sprang to mind. 
So Mr Pym's righteous indignation about Government 
bully-boy tactics seemed more like traditional political fencing 
than serious concern about the constitutional implications of 
curtailing debate. The Government were proposing it, so it 
must be opposed. The soft underbelly of the Tory attack was 
showing on the first night and it was not long before the pro-
devolutionists would be putting the boot in. 
Strangely enough, the Tory problem was laid bare on the 
first night of the committee stage, not by a devolution supporter 
but by the indefatigable Tam Dalyell, Labour MP for West 
Lothian, whose opposition to the Bill was to be expressed in an 
unending series of questions and declarations at every stage of 
the discussion, turning him into a kind of chorus to the debate, 
pulling every argument back to his firm belief that devolution 
would lead to a separate Scotland and the end of the United 
Kingdom. He demanded from Mr Pym a statement of his 
devolution policy. It was a question which would be put night 
after night. Mr Pym rested on the Tory promise of all-party talks 
to come up with a workable devolution scheme, and would not 
(for the moment) go further. But it was clear to the whole House 
that the consensus on devolution was shaky, to say the least, 
and that all-party talks would almost certainly produce nothing. 
So why not say so? Why not come out wholeheartedly against 
legislative devolution? 
There is a view among some of the staunchest antis on 
the Tory side that it was this weakness which reduced their 
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effectiveness in the debate. Mr Dalyell would agree. In the debate 
on Clause 1, Mr Pym moved an amendment to soften the effect 
of the Bill's declaration that none of the provisions affected the 
unity of the UK. It was, said Mr Dalyell, "a fudging amend-
ment". Tory criticism of the Government's scheme - that it 
would lead to constant bickering between Edinburgh and 
Westminster which in turn would lead to separation - would 
apply to any scheme for legislative devolution, would it not? No, 
said Mr Pym, but not very convincingly, since many of those 
on the benches behind him clearly agreed with Mr Dalyell. He 
ended with a defiant, but lame, statement: "That is what I 
think." 
On that first night, the Government lost Clause 1. Having 
failed with his amendment, Mr Pym led his side into the "No" 
lobby against the motion, "that the clause stand part of the 
Bill" and found himself alongside the SNP and thus defeating 
the Government. Ministers were embarrassed by the shaky start, 
but unconcerned. The clause did not have to be saved. But for 
the Conservatives the division had been embarrassing too. 
Although SNP jibes accusing them of voting against the unity 
of the UK were clearly unfair, there was a sense of unease 
among the Tory backbenchers who realised that maybe the 
votes had set the pattern for what would follow. 
Behind Mr Pym during his vigil on the Bill was an assort-
ment of dedicated opponents of devolution in any form. One 
of their leaders was Mr George Gardiner, MP for Reigate, an 
articulate right-winger and close associate of Mrs Margaret 
Thatcher. Round him sat lain Sproat (South Aberdeen), Ian 
Gow (Eastbourne), Tim Raison (Aylesbury), Graham Page 
(Crosby) and a collection of antis with less stamina. They were 
ready to bring each debate back to one simple proposition: that 
legislative devolution was not only expensive and unnecessary 
but would lead to tension which would ultimately destroy the 
UK. It was no secret that some of them suspected Mr Pym of 
being "soft" on devolution and hedging his bets about any 
future Tory policy. For them, that was just not good enough. 
They were happier with his sidekick on the Front Bench, Mr 
Leon Brittan, barrister and ex-President of the Cambridge Union, 
who seemed more offended by the principle of the Bill than 
Mr Pym and was better equipped to challenge the intellectual 
agility and rhetorical skill of the Minister of State, Mr Smith. 
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This Tory weakness had implications for their strategy. It 
was clear from the early debates that the subject of the 
guillotine was to be brought up at every turn, thereby preparing 
the ground for the hordes of Tory Peers to argue over every 
detail which had not been discussed in the Commons and justifi-
ably give the Bill a mauling, safe from any Government 
steamroller, in a House where a few phone calls to the shires 
could bring in the Tory vote. Mr Pym and his colleagues 
regularly warned the Government of the consequences of curtail-
ing debate. They would not like it in "another place", and we 
all knew what that meant. But did we? Perhaps there was a 
misreading of the Lords' intentions. After all, their Lordships 
were very keen on PR, which was scarcely close to the heart of 
Mrs Thatcher and her followers in the Commons. Certainly 
some of the backbench Tories were nervous that the Lords 
would not wreck the Bill - for the rather obvious reason that 
they were nervous about their future as legislators - and that 
therefore the Tory Front Bench strategy in the Commons was 
misconceived. 
Before considering what the official opposition achieved in 
their fight against the Government's plans, it is worth looking at 
the other members of the anti-devolution coalition. As with the 
"pros", the net was spread wide, and traditional party loyalties 
were, for the moment, forgotten. The Tories' best friend and 
worst enemy was Mr Dalyell. When he expounded his theory 
of break-up he did so with more diligence (and often better 
research) than most, though not all, of the Tories. Yet when 
he pressed Mr Pym on his policy he was no less diligent, and 
caused a few embarrassing moments. A more reliable friend 
was Mr Enoch Powell, speaking on nearly every clause, and 
carrying the break-up argument to its logical extremes night 
after night. It was impossible, he said, to devolve power to a 
subordinate legislature in a unitary state. He argued simply that 
the devolution exercise could not be carried through in the 
United Kingdom. 
Among the Labour antis there was less diligence. Mr Eric 
Heffer (Liverpool Walton) argued the case against any advantage 
for Scotland at the expense of deprived areas in England, and 
Mr George Cunningham (Islington South and Finsbury) prepared 
for his triumph in the referendum debate with a string of pro-
cedural points in an attempt to mitigate the effect of the guillotine. 
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In the Scottish contingent on the Labour side, those who 
were most active were the MPs suspicious of the Assembly, 
particularly Mr Robert Hughes (Aberdeen North) and Mr Robin 
Cook (Edinburgh Central). They took the standard left-wing 
line that devolution would contribute nothing to the economic 
regeneration of the British economy and threw in some biting 
attacks on the narrow philosophy of the SNP, with Mr Hughes 
sparking off a furious row when he described the Nationalists 
as "allies of Dr Goebbels". If they were, their propaganda was 
not very effective in the House. 
The Nationalists kept a low profile during the committee 
stage. Their bench was often occupied by only one or two 
members and many of their interventions were ritual denuncia-
tions of English members who, they claimed, did not understand 
the problems of Scotland. They provided an easy target for Mr 
Dalyell when he launched into one of his dissertations on the 
"slippery slope" argument, nodding their heads vigorously when 
he said the Assembly would be a vehicle for the drive to 
independence. However embarrassing this may have been for 
the Government, the Nationalists trooped dutifully into the right 
lobby on the crucial votes. The same is true of the Liberals, and 
they embarrassed the Government not at all. Mr Johnston acted 
as a kind of extension of the Government Front Bench, 
articulating, in his woolly way, the principles of devolution. He 
was the most active of the pro-devolutionists. 
Indeed, many of those supposed to be in favour of devolu-
tion were distinguished only by their silence. But that did not 
annoy the Government too much. Had every anti speech been 
matched by one in favour, the number of amendments discussed 
would have been even lower and the frustration might have 
triggered off more Government defeats. The burden of support-
ing the Government fell on members like Mr Johnston, Mr 
Jim Sillars (SLP, South Ayrshire), Professor John Mackintosh 
(Labour, Berwick and East Lothian), Mr Alick Buchanan-Smith 
(Conservative, North Angus and Mearns) - a brave heretic 
- and, as often as not, Mr Norman Buchan (Labour, West 
Renfrew). 
These were odd coalitions, for and against, but how much 
did they influence the course of events after the Government's 
victory on the guillotine motion? Once the votes had been 
garnered by careful surgery on the Scotland and Wales Bill, 
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much of the political battling became counterproductive, and 
the Government were reasonably happy to leave the antis to 
make the running. 
The guillotine vote was won just before the start of the 
committee stage. From then on the debate went the Govern-
ment's way until the two hammer blows on 25 January - the 
imposition of the 40% requirement on the referendum 
and the Orkney and Shetland option clauses. In the heart of the 
Bill, the opposition coalition had little effect, and it was almost 
as though most speakers were determined to extend the second 
reading debate for three months, but do no more. 
Second reading is the occasion for general speeches on the 
principle of a piece of legislation and is intended to pave the way 
for line-by-line examination of each clause at the committee 
stage. But on the Scotland Bill the same general arguments were 
heard again and again. The opponents argued that each clause 
drove them back to the principle. Mr Sproat would refer to the 
"irreducible conundrum" that was the Bill, others would talk 
of "the very heart" of the legislation, and there was a general 
drift away from the detail of pre-enactment review, or PR or 
tax-raising powers, to the principle of legislative devolution. 
Dominating it all was "the West Lothian Question", posed by 
Mr Dalyell and gratefully seized upon by all his temporary 
allies. 
The argument is now well known. Mr Dalyell argued that 
after devolution a Scottish MP would be able to vote on English 
matters such as education and local government - matters for 
which he had no responsibility in Scotland because the Assembly 
would have legislative competence in these areas. He said Scottish 
MPs would be "mongrel" members. The Government's answer 
to this was, in effect: "So what?" 
Mr Smith admitted he had no direct answer to the question 
as posed. Time and time again Tories would return to the dis-
ruptive effect in England of a Government kept in power by 
"mongrel" Scots legislating on subjects in England which were 
devolved in Scotland. The Government's answer was that this 
was a problem, but not a sufficient reason for blocking devolu-
tion. Perhaps Mr Powell realised this. He habitually referred to 
the Dalyell argument not as a question but as "the West Lothian 
Proposition". It fitted nicely into his argument that it was 
impossible to maintain the sovereignty of Parliament with a 
c 
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subordinate legislature, but the argument found no converts 
among those who had decided they wanted devolution and that 
the Bill was as near to a satisfactory solution as they could get. 
The West Lothian debate enlivened the Bill's opponents because 
it was an eloquent statement of a situation they found offensive. 
To the pro-devolutionists (apart from the SNP) it was a secondary 
concern - an anomaly which they were prepared to live with to 
accommodate what they saw as a vital constitutional change. 
The Government adopted a similar posture in response 
to the constant warnings about "the recipe for conflict" in the 
Bill. If there was a prize for the most-repeated phrase, "the 
recipe" would probably win hands down. Mr Smith based his 
reply on the assumption that the Scots would elect an Assembly 
which would behave responsibly and would demonstrate political 
maturity. Even if there was a Tory Government in London 
and a Labour Executive in Edinburgh - the most frequently-
used scenario - he said he had no reason to suppose that most 
problems would not be tackled in a spirit of co-operation. He 
repeated this many times, and opponents said many times that 
it was not true. As soon as the committee stage started it was 
clear that there could be no agreement on the extent to which 
the Assembly would fight with Westminster, and it was the 
theme which lay behind most of the debate. 
The twice-weekly sessions revolved around this dispute and 
the dispute over the relevance of the West Lothian Question. 
Until the coalition of antis turned to the referendum and Orkney 
and Shetland, they sang the same song over and over again. The 
amendments moved by the Tory Front Bench reflected this 
overriding concern, but they failed to amend the Bill in the 
way they wanted. Mr Pym and his colleagues tried to reduce 
the number of Assembly members; to strengthen the control of 
the Commons over Assembly legislation; to restore some of the 
power of the Secretary of State for Scotland which he had had 
in the Scotland and Wales Bill and to remove some of the 
devolved areas from the Assembly's control. But through it all 
there seemed to be no coherent plan. Mr Pym seemed equivocal 
on the desirability of the Assembly. He refused to say whether 
he thought some kind of devolution would work, only that he 
knew this scheme would not. So the opposition chipped away 
at the structure of the Bill, succeeded in knocking out the two 
declaratory clauses, but failed to present an alternative which 
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could persuade some waverers to oppose the Government. 
In the eleven days of debate between the guillotine vote 
and the insertion of new clauses on the referendum and Orkney 
and Shetland, the main provisions of the Bill emerged unscathed. 
The House approved the mechanics of the Assembly: two 
members for each Westminster constituency with extra members 
for some large seats; first-past-the-post-elections; the power of 
the Assembly to dissolve itself in case of deadlock; technical 
details of membership qualifications. 
The powers of the Assembly were also untouched. The 
structure of the ruling executive and its rights to legislate -
circumscribed by the ultimate authority of Parliament, the 
powers of the Secretary of State and the Judicial Committee 
of the Privy Council - built up as the guillotines fell regularly 
at 11 p.m. and the Government notched up the marks on its 
timetable, and looked hopefully for Royal Assent before the 
summer recess. 
During the debates on the extent of the Assembly's powers 
and the ways in which they would be exercised, two attempts 
were made to introduce a new dimension into devolution. One 
was a proposal for proportional representation and the other for 
tax-raising powers for the Assembly, both moved by Professor 
John P. Mackintosh. The PR amendment, predictably, fell by 
209 votes to 107 and the tax-raising proposal by a crushing 
301-61 margin. It seemed there was no possibility of extending 
the Assembly's powers in any way: the House was reluctant to 
go even as far as the Government had proposed, and that only 
after a display of fine arm-twisting and the threat of a vote 
of confidence leading to an election to which some of the rebels 
could only look forward with a shudder. 
But the reluctance to experiment changed dramatically on 
25 January 1978, a night which revived in Ministers' minds the 
memory of the guillotine vote a year before. In retrospect it is 
possible to see the ground being laid weeks before the ambush in 
the referendum debate. During his speech on second reading, 
Mr George Gardiner promised that he and his fellow objectors 
would be looking very carefully at the question of what con-
stituted a decisive majority in the referendum. At the time, it 
seemed a cloud no bigger than a man's hand, but the Govern-
ment's problems multiplied from the moment Mr George 
Cunningham put down his new clause, requiring the Secretary 
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of State to lay before Parliament an order repealing the Act 
unless at least 40% of the electorate (not just of those voting) 
voted "Yes" in the referendum. 
It is now known that Tory anti-devolutionists were keen 
to have the new clause moved by a Labour member, in the 
hope of picking up some extra support. In Mr Cunningham -
himself a Scot - they found a formidable ally. He argued per-
suasively that if the Government were so certain that a majority 
of Scots were in favour of the devolution scheme, why did they 
oppose his plan which would only ensure that the question was 
decided by a reasonable proportion of the people of Scotland? 
His argument simply served to polarise the feelings of 
the pros and antis. Those who had been in the middle, persuaded 
to support the Bill, perhaps out of loyalty to their own govern-
ment, tended to go the Cunningham way. For those with fixed 
views on the principle of devolution the argument was either a 
logical test of the Government's premise for drawing up 
legislation or an attempt to fix the result of the referendum, 
and an insult to the Scottish electorate. It was the touchstone. 
The argument brought out some of the passions which had often 
been dormant in earlier stages. There were predictions that 
the 40% test would be seen as an affront by Scots voters and, 
from the other side, claims that a constitutional issue of such 
importance should have a built-in test to guard against a freak 
result. 
By the time Mr Smith rose to reply to the debate, passions 
in the House were running high. There was a complication which 
had heightened the tension. Earlier in the day the anti-
devolutionists had accused the Leader of the House, Mr Michael 
Foot, of attempting to prevent debate on "the Grimond amend-
ment" by imposing an extra guillotine in mid-evening, thereby 
splitting up a group of amendments. They suspected a "fix" -
since the new time allocation would probably mean the Orkney 
and Shetland amendment would not be reached. All amendments 
not moved before the appropriate guillotine would fall, never 
to be revived. 
The Government's intention had been to alter the guillotines 
to allow time for a debate on a proposal from Mr Norman 
Buchan for a third question - on independence - in the 
referendum. But their opponents were in no mood to believe 
that. Mr Foot withdrew the offending guillotine. Now, after 
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winning that fight, the antis realised that if the vote on the 
Cunningham amendment was not over and the Grimond 
amendment moved before 11 p.m., the chance to build the 
Orkney and Shetland complication into the Bill would be lost. 
So, as the Minister of State struggled manfully to prolong the 
debate and answer the points made by Mr Cunningham, the jeers 
and shouts began and he looked rattled for the first and last 
time in all his sessions at the dispatch box. Under pressure, he 
wound up a short speech. 
He sat down at 10.27 p.m. and the rush to vote began. 
First came a paving amendment by the Labour MP, Mr Bruce 
Douglas-Mann- to build in a 33t% test- and when that was 
won the antis knew they could romp home on the Cunningham 
amendment. The question was whether it would be over in time 
to move the Grimond amendment on Orkney and Shetland, 
which they felt would follow in the wake. 
What came next was a parliamentary caper worthy of a 
Feydeau farce. It involved the Serjeant-at-Arms and his sword, 
a folding opera hat and the redoubtable Sir Myer Galpern, a 
deputy speaker. As members trickled back into the Chamber 
to wait for the result of the Cunningham amendment - counting 
can take anything up to 15 minutes after an important vote -
a teller for the "Ayes", Mr William Hamilton, reported to Sir 
Myer (in a loud voice) that he had seen some members deliberat-
ely obstructing the "No" lobby, presumably in an attempt to 
delay the count until the magic hour of 11 p.m. Sir Myer, his 
face suffused with indignation, sent the Serjeant-at-Arms to the 
lobby to flush out the offending members with his sword, while 
the Tories - with Mr Teddy Taylor as cheerleader - began to 
chant "cheat, cheat" at some very white-faced Government 
Ministers opposite. During all this furore, several members who 
were anxious to make points of order had to call for the 
collapsible opera hat, specially kept under the Serjeant's chair 
for use when members wish to "rise, covered" to make a point 
of order during a division. The Tory jeers and Labour laughter 
grew louder as Mr Foot plucked at his mane and looked around 
as if nothing had happened which should concern a mere 
Leader of the House. 
When the loiterers were cleared from the lobby, the result 
was announced amid scenes of excitement which belied the 
belief in some quarters that devolution was a bore. The 40% 
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test was accepted by 168 votes to 142, a majority against the 
Government of 26. To keep the drama going, Mr Jo Grimond 
rose to propose his amendment with the comment: "A damned 
close-run thing, if I may say so." Indeed it was, with members 
filing into the lobbies just one minute before the guillotine fell. As 
expected, his amendment was carried, by 204 votes to 118. 
The Government had resigned themselves to defeat on the 
40% test some days before, but had hoped to avoid a similar 
fate on Orkney and Shetland. However, the apparent reluctance 
of some Shetlanders to accept the proposed devolution settlement 
had caught the imagination of many English members, thanks 
to some assiduous lobbying by a team from the Shetland Islands 
Council and a few trips north for the enthusiasts. MPs like 
Eldon Griffiths, Tim Raison and Ian Gow had seized on the 
subject and lost no opportunity to bring it up. So, although 
there was no debate on the amendment itself, the word had 
got around. The antis saw in the Grimond amendment - which 
proposed only that a commission should examine the position of 
Orkney and Shetland if they voted "No" - a chance to wreck 
the Government scheme and also to embarrass the SNP, whom 
they accused of arguing for autonomy for Scotland while 
opposing autonomy for a self-contained community because they 
feared the loss of oil revenue. The fact that the SNP were 
indeed sensitive and looked on the consequences of the amend-
ment with some trepidation, is emphasised by the fact that two 
of the loiterers in the lobby were Nationalists, Mr Hamish Watt 
and Mr Douglas Henderson. 
The Government's response to those who favoured an opt-
out clause for Orkney and Shetland was that it would discuss 
with the Islands Councils their problems, but would also point 
out that there was little danger of oil revenues disappearing into 
an Edinburgh coffer for use in central Scotland because energy 
was not a devolved subject, and the Assembly had no direct right 
to the revenue. The moment the Grimond amendment was 
carried they gave up hope of removing it at report stage: the 
emotional appeal of the Shetland case had been too great. On 
the 40% test, the fact that they doubted their ability to delete it 
from the Bill was demonstrated when at report stage the 
necessary motion was put, not by a Government Minister, but 
by Mr Dennis Canavan, a Labour backbencher. They did try 
a compromise figure of 33!%, but this fell along with the 
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Canavan amendment after a debate dominated by a powerful 
speech from Mr Cunningham, during which he held a crowded 
House silent and attentive. 
The only other significant Government defeat was on an 
amendment from Mr Dalyell imposing a statutory three month 
gap between the referendum and any General Election. Despite 
assurances from Mr Smith that the Government would not 
confuse the two campaigns, the new clause was inserted. For Mr 
Dalyell and others - loyal to the Labour Party - the prospect 
of arguing against their Government (on devolution) and for it 
(on everything else) was too much to be expected of anyone 
on the same day. 
So at the back of the Scotland Bill which trundled into 
the House of Lords in the Spring were three new clauses, the 
result of the committee and report stages in the Commons. 
But the kind of Assembly they would be considering in their 
own scrutiny of the Bill would be precisely that envisaged by 
the Government. 
The victories for the antis in the Commons came when 
they were able to reduce the argument to its fundamental 
principles, and rely on a groundswell of feeling against legislative 
devolution. That happened in the run-up to the vote on the 40% 
test. No one in the Chamber believed some supporters of the 
40% test who said that it did not reflect their antipathy to devolu-
tion and was not a wrecking amendment: its supporters were seen 
to be the antis, and vice versa. Similarly, in the earlier debates, 
those who had said the Assembly would not work - a purely 
practical argument - were seen to be those who also found the 
principle of devolution a worrying one. The two arguments 
tended to blend together, but at the heart of the opposition lay 
not practical arguments but strong feelings for the unity of the 
UK and suspicions of the links between devolution and 
nationalism. 
These feelings extended to the break-up argument, but 
always seemed to come from those who were dissatisfied with the 
prospect of a non-legislative "talking-shop" in Edinburgh. The 
conflict which resulted in the Government defeats at the end 
of the committee stage and in report stage came when the 
argument was reduced to the fundamental divide between those 
who believed that democratic progress lay in devolution, however 
tentative, and those who believed that any tinkering with the 
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constitutional framework was a "recipe for confusion and 
conflict". 
On each devolution night at the Commons, through the 
winter, the divide seemed to open further as if in preparation for 
the 40% vote. There were the confident assertions of the die-
hard unionists that there was no demand for devolution, such as 
that from Mr John Stokes, Tory MP for Halesowen and 
passionate defender of union and the Empire, who said: "On 
a recent visit to Scotland I could hardly find one Scotsman there 
who wanted the Bill. I tried to speak to everyone I saw. "4 How 
Mr Stokes explained the presence of the SNP in the House, or 
the Labour Party's conversion to devolution, or, for that matter, 
the nearly-forgotten "Declaration of Perth", no one knows. 
Many members appeared to be confident that devolution would 
be thrown out in the referendum, although some would doubtless 
admit that there was the 40% test, just in case. 
The contrasting view came from the convinced reformists 
like Mr Buchanan-Smith, men who had not adopted a devolution-
ary stance for the sake of peace in the Party but because they 
actually believed in it. In his third reading speech, Mr Buchanan-
Smith said that if the House failed to pass the Bill, it would be 
failing democracy itself. 
With such conflicting views, it was inevitable that much 
of the debate would be repetitious and often tedious. Indeed, 
there were times when the devolution debate was raging in 
Scotland while, at the centre of the argument on the !loor of the 
House, there was a still and awful calm. Fifteen MPs might be 
stretched on the green leather benches - their colleagues some-
times peeping in and scurrying off again - while Mr Dalyell 
quoted from his book or Mr Graham Page lectured on the history 
of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, or Mr Douglas 
Crawford talked about "the Scottish pound". Interest in the 
Bill was limited, both amongst MPs and, alas, in the Press. 
To be sure, there was a rush to the lobbies (or the typewriters) 
when the division bells began to clang, usually at 11 p.m., but 
for the debates themselves a large number of political aficionados 
took a break. 
However, it would be unfair to denigrate those who took 
part (or most of them, anyway). Mr Dalyell took on a lonely 
fight, and fought it with a spirit which won him the admiration 
of everyone in the House, however frustrating he may have 
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been when he announced such earth-shattering news as his tally 
of letters from constituents: after the first guillotine, he said, 
more people had written to him about the price of canary seed 
than about devolution, presumably proving that the British 
public cared not a whit about constitutional change but were 
getting very upset about whether they would be able to feed their 
budgies. 
Towering over the debates was Mr Smith, who won glowing 
compliments, not only from his supporters on devolution but 
from the Tory Front Bench, for his handling of the Bill. His 
grasp of the complex detail of the Bill never faltered, and he 
never failed to defend the right of the Scots to elect the kind of 
Assembly they wanted, with freedom to act over a wide range of 
issues within the framework of the UK. His constant theme 
was that the Assembly would be composed of reasonable people 
and that "the recipe for conflict" argument was scaremongering. 
Conflict there would be but it would be controlled in the political 
apparatus included in the Bill. 
Mr Smith gave the impression of enjoying himself 
thoroughly, even when the debate was straying into the further 
reaches of the imaginations of some Empire Loyalists. Above all 
he relished the fight with Mr Teddy Taylor on the Tory Front 
Bench, whom he called "the urban guerilla" of Scottish politics. 
Mr Taylor it was who was the most effective member of the 
Tory Scottish team. He would leap to his feet with a savage 
attack on the guillotine or a brilliantly quick calculation of the 
cost of a particular measure, always reduced, in the populist 
way, to a simple (and quotable) phrase. It was gut politics 
and the Tory attack always seemed more fiery when the urban 
guerilla was on form. 
For much of the time, the dedicated opponents or supporters 
of devolution traded scenarios for the conduct of Assembly 
business without getting anywhere. It is the view of some 
Government Ministers that the opposition could have achieved 
much more, given the shaky state of the devolution coalition, 
if they had succeeded in curtailing debate on some amendments 
and packing more into the time allowed by the guillotine. 
Seldom was there a debate which did not drag on longer than 
was necessary. 
On one occasion the Tories were attacking the cost of the 
Assembly - about £4t million in capital expenditure and £13 
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million a year in running costs. Speech after speech covered the 
same ground, straying into the West Lothian Question and what 
was claimed to be the lunacy of different laws in Scotland and 
England on uncontroversial subjects. Mr Sproat was moved to 
bring up the question of dog licences, only drawing a retort 
from Mr Johnston to the effect that there were different regula-
tions for the control of dogs in the various cantons of Switzer-
land and he had not noticed a constitutional crisis there. 
Sometimes the debate seemed to miss the point. 
But it would be unfair to suggest that the members who 
took part regularly did not take their role seriously: they did. 
Some of them (on both sides) were certainly misguided, and 
some hopelessly confused about the provisions of the Bill. But 
most of them tried, and several - like Mr Smith, Mr Dalyell, 
Mr Brittan, Mr Johnston, Mr Powell and Professor Mackintosh 
- distinguished themselves at different stages of the debate. 
But what did the exercise achieve? A Bill was passed, 
slightly amended. The extent to which the devolution argument 
penetrates the most deeply held political attitudes was clearly 
shown in the collision between the unionists and the devolvers. 
The fragility of traditional party loyalty on the issue was 
demonstrated night after night. 
The form of the debate was controlled by one important 
factor. The guillotine took away the chance of a fiilibuster and 
with it the chance for the antis to drive a steamroller through 
the Bill, building up frustration in all-night sittings and in long 
expositions of well-known attitudes. Their task was made more 
difficult by the fact that many Labour antis were "softer" than 
they had imagined, and trooped dutifully into the Government 
lobby to vote for the guillotine. It was also made more difficult 
by their doubts about the dedication of Mr Pym to their cause. 
With a more coherent Tory strategy they could perhaps have 
achieved more. 
For the Government, it was a relief. With confidence in 
the result of the referendum, they could be happy with the 
outcome of the Commons stages of the Bill. While they might 
have been looking forward to the battles in the House of Lords 
with some trepidation they could reflect that they had steered 
through a hostile Commons a Bill which at one time seemed 
unpopular enough to be guaranteed instant defeat. The sad 
thing is that it was not done simply by winning the argument, 
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because winning the argument could not be enough for the 
House. They did present the better case, and they got the votes, 
but it was not the merits of the case which filled the Government 
lobby. The House of Commons just does not work that way. 
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